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Abstract 
The evolution of how the Executive branch of both Brazil and the United States issue Executive decrees has changed 
over time.  American Presidents have consistently increased the number of executive orders issued over the course of the 
last 50 years. The Brazilian Executive has also seen a resurgence in the government's power to conduct Legislative de-
liberation. This paper aims to compare and contrast both the medida provisória issued by Brazilian Presidents and the 
executive order issued by U.S. Presidents through a historic and analytical lens.    
 
1. Introduction 
The American press normally refers to Brazilian me-
didas provisórias as executive orders. To be fair, academia 
and think tanks also commit the same mistake. It is a com-
prehensible error.  Journalists have a day-to-day approach 
regarding the news; they have carte blanche when dealing 
with technicalities. Academics may also receive a free pass 
on the subject, as long as they are not lawyers or jurists. In 
their case, law is a source of information, not a perspective 
or methodology. 
There are major differences concerning executive orders 
and medidas provisórias. In fact, they differ in nature, def-
inition, characteristics, usage and historical features among 
other things.  Their differences shine a light on the very 
distinction between American constitutional foundations 
and Brazil’s search for the rule of law. 
Most of Latin America is said to have been born in 
blood and fire.  Brazil largely escaped a bloody beginning; 
however, it was not free of dictatorship nor presidential 
strongmen.  The presidential systems in many countries in 
the Western Hemisphere have pushed for a some type of 
executive decree or pronouncement.  In the United States 
there is the executive order whereas in Brazil there is the 
medida provisória.  This paper seeks to conceptualize and 
compare both American executive orders and the Brazilian 
medida provisoria.  
2. American Executive Orders 
Historical background 
Several of the most well known executive orders have 
shaped the history of the United States,  sometimes they 
have yielded a better social fabric for the nation or at times 
caused a dark stain on the American consciousness.  The 
desegregation of the armed forces by Harry S. Truman 
pioneered the way to complete desegregation across the 
country.  Franklin D. Roosevelt's executive order to intern 
Japanese Americans was a clear dark mark on the history 
of the nation while Dwight Eisenhower's executive order 
desegregating schools in 1957 generated the push that was 
needed to further Brown vs. Board of Education. 
George Washington started issuing executive orders to pre-
pare reports for inspection as well as one instituting the Thanks-
giving holiday.  Abraham Lincoln is notoriously infamous for 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil 
War.  Lincoln cited the Constitution ́s Suspension Clause to justi-
fy his order, "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion and invasion the 
public safety may require it." President Lincoln issued the 
first presidential directive to be formally designated as an 
"executive order." That directive was issued on October 20, 
1862; however, it was not numbered as "Executive Order 
No. 1" until 1907.  
The phrase “stroke of a pen” is now virtually synony-
mous with executive prerogative, and it is often used spe-
cifically to refer to the president's ability to make policy via 
executive order.1 Safire's Political Dictionary defines the 
phrase as “by executive order; action that can be taken by a 
Chief Executive without legislative action.”2 Safire traces 
the political origins of the phrase to a nineteenth-century 
poem by Edmund Clarence Stedman, but it was in use long 
before this, at least as a literary metaphor signifying discre-
tionary power or fiat.3 The phrase became mostwidely 
known during the 1960 presidential election campaign, 
when Democrats made an issue of Eisenhower's refusal to 
issue an executive order banning discrimination in housing 
and federal employment.4 Kennedy committed to ending 
discrimination in housing by executive order. During the 
second Kennedy-Nixon debate on October 7, 1960, Kenne-
dy continued his criticism,“What will be the leadership of 
the President in these areas,” he asked, “to provide equality 
of opportunity for employment?5 Equality of opportunity in 
the field of housing, which could be done in all federal-
supported housing by a stroke of the President's pen.”6 
Kennedy eventually issued the fair housing order in No-
vember 1962. 
Another demonstration of Executive Prowess regarding 
executive orders heralds from President Reagan’s Execu-
                                                             
1 Kenneth R. Mayer, With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders 
and Presidential Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), Pg. 8. 
2 Ibid, 8. 
3 Ibid, 8. 
4 Ibid, 8. 
5 Ibid, 8. 
6 Ibid, 8. 
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tive Order 12532, Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other 
Transactions Involving South Africa (50 FR 36861; Sep-
tember 10,1985).7  This executive order exemplified how 
the president can use a unilateral order to take policy in a 
different direction from Congress.7  President Reagan and 
Congress wanted to penalize apartheid South Africa but 
were dissonant as to how to go about doing so, President 
Reagan wanted less harsher sanctions on the Cold War ally 
than Congress. Being the Commander-in-Chief during the 
waning days of the Cold War, Reagan realized how vital it 
was to maintain South Africa as a staunch ally in Africa 
whilst being forceful against human rights violations.  
Through political tenacity and by using the executive order 
President Reagan was able to walk the fine line between 
demands from Congress regarding apartheid South Africa 
and looking strong Cold War international relations.  
American executive orders have become increasingly 
more routine and profound over time.  With presidents 
using them more frequently vice sparingly.  Abraham Lin-
coln issued less than 50 executive orders during his slightly 
over four years in office whereas several presidents such as 
Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush issued 320 and 166 
respectively.  Franklin Delano Roosevelt holds the record of 
executive orders issued with more than 3,400 executive 
due to his activities to mitigate the Great Depression and 
actions in preparation for WW2. Since FDR´s comman-
deering of the executive order there has been a penchant by 
American Presidents to use them. There has been a defini-
tive upward trend in the power yielded by the Chief Execu-
tive of the United States in the second half of the twentieth 
century 
Legal Nature of American Executive Orders 
There is not an official definition of what constitutes an 
executive order; there is no law—or even an executive or-
der—that defines what exactly is an executive order.8 There 
is also no constitutional or statutory definition of “procla-
mation,” or any other form of presidential directive.9 It is 
enough to assert where legally executive orders rank for 
now. Executive orders are a kind of unilateral presidential 
directives (UPDs), according to the definition of academic 
Graham G. Doods. There are over two dozen different types 
of unilateral presidential directives.10 A study by the Con-
gressional Research Service (CRS) in 2007 identified twen-
ty-seven distinct types ranging from administrative orders, 
certificates, designations of officials to letters on tariffs and 
                                                             
7 Belco, Michelle, and Brandon Rottinghaus. "In Lieu of Legisla-
tion." Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2013): 413-25. 
doi:10.1177/1065912913501410. Pg. 415.   
8 Graham G. Dodds, Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential 
Directives in American Politics (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 5. 
http://www.questia.com/read/124312900/take-up-your-pen-
unilateral-presidential-directives. 
9 Executive Orders and National Emergencies How Presidents 
Have Come to “Run the Country” by Usurping Legislative Pow-
er by William J. Olson and Alan Woll, p. 8. 
10 Graham G. Dodds, Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential 
Directives in American Politics (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 5. 
international trade among others.11 An executive order is a 
unilateral directive issued by the president to instruct 
agencies on how to implement the law.12 They serve a va-
riety of functions, including executive branch maintenance, 
creating or altering policy, and responding to crises.13 
Presidential directives in the United States are the 
means of which the Executive acts. Article II of the Consti-
tution restricts the president to an enforcement role. This 
mandates that presidential directives should be only lim-
ited to direct operations within the executive branch. In 
this regard, American directives are top-down obligatory 
instructions within the government Executive structure, 
not properly being law.14 Their effects should not have valid 
legal repercussions in either the powers of the Judiciary, 
nor Legislative. 
Article I of the United States Constitution vests law-
making power in the congress, which in turn partially dele-
gates discretionary power to the president. Such delegation 
is a symbol of autonomy granted to the Executive branch. It 
means, to a certain extent, that the president can run his 
own policies by legally enacting them in the manner he best 
sees fit. A president which is completely restrained by the 
Legislative would be ineffective, which would negate the 
inherent power of the Executive.  
The question becomes how much of this discretionary 
capacity is bestowed to the president? Federalist number 
70 written by Alexander Hamilton, whose title is “The Ex-
ecutive Department Further Considered,” debates this very 
subject. Hamilton argues for a vigorous unitary executive 
structure that could more easily press its will and provide 
guidelines to government initiatives, especially when deal-
ing with wars or national emergencies. He calls for an “en-
ergetic Executive”, that would be more fit to quick decision-
making, in plain contrast with the  slow-pace deliberative 
nature of the Legislative. Although not originally being on 
the winning side on this debate, through the years Hamil-
ton’s ideas have gained momentum, given the consistent 
growth in the number of executive orders being issued and 
their broadening scope. 
The Founding Fathers did not mention in detail how the 
Executive would act or follow through in the enforcement 
of his power.  For practical reasons, it is difficult to estab-
lish a stark contrast between executive orders and unilat-
eral presidential directives per se, although it is possible to 
distinguish them in abstracto.  The crux of this inability to 
distinguish how U.S. presidents act is rooted in the oath of 
the president, "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
                                                             
11 Ibid,.6. 
12 Graham G. Dodds, Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential 
Directives in American Politics (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 4. 
13 Ibid, 4. 
14 They are generally viewed by the courts as legally binding as 
long as they do not violate statutes or the Constitution (Cooper 
2002; Mayer 2001). As such, executive orders are published in 
the Federal Register and viewed as part of the law. Paul Benga-
la, advisor to President Clinton, even said “Stroke of the pen, 
law of the land. Kind of Cool”. It seems there is a consensus that 
unilateral presidential directives (more specifically executive 
orders) are not law itself, but functions like one.  
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faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.”  Since 
the wording "the best of my Ability," highlights an individ-
ual's ability, it is sublime to the fact that the ability of one 
individual is different from another.  Thus presidents in-
herently execute the office differently.   
Aspects of U.S. Executive Orders 
As a result of the barriers to decisive leadership and the 
natural dilemma between the legislative branch and the 
executive branch due to checks and balances, presidents 
have become naturally more eager to issue executive orders 
in order to comply as they see fit with their constitutional 
duty of enforcing the law.  This more nuanced use of au-
thority has given rise to Presidential Federalism where the 
Chief Executive of the United States exercises more power 
in order to promote what they see as the correct course of 
action in fulfilling their duties.   
Presidents have a tendency to issue an executive order 
to appease a certain constituency. Presidential Federalism 
makes distinct subnational communities more dependent 
on the political success of their leader in the White House.15 
In nationalizing the political conversation and policy con-
sequences of every administrative action, Presidential Fed-
eralism challenges the very idea of whether anything in 
contemporary U.S. politics is, “in the nature of things,” 
truly local anymore.16 
The propensity of Presidential Federalism has grown 
through the years as the nation's chief executive has used 
his power supported by Article II of the Constitution to 
advance what he perceives as the rightful execution of the 
Constitution even when congress is at odds with his pro-
grams.  Since the concept of Presidential Federalism is 
based on who the Commander in Chief is, there will natu-
rally be a disparity with the issuing president ́s successor.  
Presidents continue to behave as if they are the nation's 
doctor, teacher, pastor, and engineer; meanwhile, those 
supposedly closest to the people remain hamstrung by fed-
eral directives and national party loyalties.17 
The executive order may also be used as a tactic to push 
the president's agenda.  When the Congress and the presi-
dent are deadlocked and the president feels that he cannot 
garner the support he needs, he will issue an executive 
order. "Presidents are more likely to issue a preemptive 
order when the issue is on their political agenda. If the 
issue is on their agenda, presidents should be more likely to 
act unilaterally, even if they risk a negative reaction from 
Congress. Presidents often use this tactic to make progress 
on a legislative agenda item using executive orders."18   
                                                             
15 Jacobs, Nicholas F., and Connor M. Ewing. "The Law: The 
Promises and Pathologies of Presidential Federalism." Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2018): 552-69. 
doi:10.1111/psq.12480. Pg. 565.  
16 Ibid, 565.  
17 Ibid, 565.   
18 Belco, Michelle, and Brandon Rottinghaus. "In Lieu of Legisla-
tion." Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 2 (2013): 413-25. 
doi:10.1177/1065912913501410. 
Since no president can serve more than eight years in 
office and as is often the case a member of the opposing 
political party takes charge of the executive branch from his 
predecessor the odds of an executive order being revoked 
or superseded is furthered by these possibilities.  Of the 
6,158 executive orders issued between 1937 and 2013, 18 
percent have been amended, 8 percent have been super-
seded, and 25 percent have been revoked.19 From those 
altered orders, it takes an average of five years until an 
order is first amended or superseded and 13 years until 
revocation.20  
However, the possibility of an executive order being re-
voked can depend on the changing political climate it faces 
over time. Presidents may be more reluctant to revoke ex-
ecutive orders during election years.21 For better or worse it 
can boil down to popularity and where the president may 
be positioned in light of being the most receptive to the 
widest range of the electorate.  It can also be argued that 
the American President's executive orders cannot only aid 
the concept of "the bully pulpit," but it also can further the 
notion that it is a popular measure.  These precepts lend to 
the pretense that the executive order may be transient in 
nature as over 50 percent of executive orders are altered in 
some capacity.  
Presidents are more willing to revoke executive orders 
when it is less costly to do so and when issued by a political 
adversary; yet, this propensity to revoke opposing orders is 
diminished by the president’s desire to preserve others 
based on a more legitimate authority.22 It should also be 
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court can negate an executive order 
as unconstitutional as the U.S. Supreme Court did against Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman ́s wish to nationalize the steel industry for 
the Korean War.  The U.S. Congress also has the power to issue 
legislation to override an executive order however, it must have 
the votes needed to override a probable presidential veto.   
American Presidents are more willing to revoke execu-
tive orders when it is less costly to do so and when issued 
by a political adversary; yet, this propensity to revoke op-
posing orders is diminished by the president’s desire to 
preserve others based on more legitimate 
ty.23American executive orders do not endure forever 
though. Over 50 percent of them have been either amend-
ed, or revoked. Indeed, they may also be superseded.24  
                                                             
19 Thrower, Sharece. "To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political 
Determinants of Executive Order Longevity." American Journal 
of Political Science 61, no. 3 (2017): 642-56. 
doi:10.1111/ajps.12294, pg. 644. 
20 Ibid, 644. 
21 Ibid, 647 
22 Ibid, 647. 
23 Ibid, 647. 
24 “Of the 6,158 executive orders issued between 1937 and 2013, 
18% are amended, 8% are superseded, and 25% are revoked. 
From those altered orders, it takes an average of 5 years until an 
order is first amended or super- seded and 13 years until revo-
cation”.  
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3. Brazilian Medidas Provisórias  
Historical background  
Medidas provisórias which translated directly to English 
are called provisory/provisional measures”. The Medidas 
Provisórias hails from Article 62 of the actual Brazilian 
Constitution 
The medida provisória is a replacement to the decreto-
lei (decree-law) Brazil used to have. Before 1937, there was 
no provision whatsoever on law-passing based on Execu-
tive measures. One may argue that the Imperial Constitu-
tion of 1824 already established some sort of Executive 
measure in this sense. However, it was not a direct refer-
ence, rather a government action made possible by specific 
circumstances such as crisis and wars. 
Between 1891 and 1937, there were two different consti-
tutions, but neither prescribed any form of Executive law-
making discretion.. During that time, the Executive branch 
was not able to issue medidas provisórias, executive orders, 
and decree-laws. 
The period between 1891-1930 is normally referred to as 
the “República Café com Leite” (The Republic of Coffee 
with Milk). Coffee was the main commodity produced in 
São Paulo state at that time, whereas milk production was 
mainly centered in Minas Gerais state.  The República Café 
com Leite represented a moment in Brazilian history where 
oligarchical consensus between the two states was founda-
tional to the very functioning of the government. As a con-
sequence, there was arguably a relatively stable balance 
between the Executive and Legislative branches.  Thus 
there was harmony in the Federal government brought 
about by oligarchal cooperation.  Since there was implicit 
agreement during these years there was arguably no need 
for executive decrees.   
After President Getúlio Vargas’ historical revolution in 
1930, which ended the República Café com Leite, it took 
him a few years to convoke the National Constituent As-
sembly. The convocation of which is fundamental to 
establishing a new constitution. In 1934 a new constitu-
tion was approved based on the American New Deal and 
the Weimar Republic's Constitution. However, what 
happened was a general agreement of various political 
groups and the 1934 Constitution became similar to the 
1891 Constitution. As was the case with the 1891 Consti-
tution, the 1934 Constitution had no provision on de-
cree-laws, executive orders or provisional measures 
based on the Executive.  
Given the fact that the 1930’s was mainly predicated 
upon strong executive regimes throughout the world, 
the Brazilian Constitution of 1934 had a short lifespan.  
In 1937 it was replaced by an authoritarian constitution, 
initiating what is understood as the “Estado Novo” (the 
New State). Only then executive based decree-laws were 
introduced, as a means of concentrating President Var-
gas’s power.  
Article 180 of the 1937 Constitution stipulated that 
“while the National Parliament is not reunited, the Pres-
ident of the Republic will have the power of issuing de-
cree-laws on all legislative powers of the Union." How-
ever, President Vargas never authorized the National 
Parliament to be reestablish. During nine years, Vargas 
gained full government control and passed significant 
legislation, through decrees-laws many of them are still 
in effect today. That is the case of the labor law code 
Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, Civil Procedure 
Code (only replaced by the New Code in 2016), Criminal 
Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Law of Contraventions, 
Decree-law No. 406. To this very day every Brazilian per-
son, while in Brazil, is submitted to labor and criminal laws 
passed by the exorbitant dictatorial powers that Getúlio 
Vargas had more than 70 years ago.  
In 1946 democracy was restated and any executive or-
der, medida provisória or decree-law constitutionally guar-
anteed was once again eliminated. During the fifties and 
beginning of the sixties, Brazilian politics suffered several 
tumultuous years, which led to a military coup d’état. 
One year after the military coup, President Castello 
Branco issued ato institucional number two and inaugu-
rated executive capacity regarding decree-law on homeland 
security/national emergence. The decree set the stage for 
the regime to establish itself. Once the military regime was 
established an economic upturn ensued and military gov-
ernment issued a new constitution. A few years later, there 
was an amendment somewhat resurrecting Vargas decree-
laws’ model that enabled the President to once again have 
considerable power.   
Throughout Brazilian history it can be seen that Execu-
tive discretionary power is like a pendulum swinging back 
and forth.  During democracy, there seems to be a complete 
lack of constitutional guarantee toward the executive, 
which led to clashes among the government branches, en-
croachments or inherent constraints. While in autocracy, 
the Executive vests itself with full law-making capacity and 
devoids the Legislative to more of a figurehead role.   
Bearing the aforementioned in mind the constitu-
tional architects in 1988 adopted a mild form of Execu-
tive legislative act: the medida provisória. It was partial-
ly influenced by the decreto-legge, from the Italian Con-
stitution of 1947.  Article 77 of the Italian Constitution 
establishes ,much like the Brazilian Constitution, the 
adoption of decreto-legge in which the executive (prime-
minister) can only issue an order in case of extraordi-
nary necessity and urgency (in casi straordinari di ne-
cessità e d’urgenza). 
Legal Nature of the Brazilian Medidas Provisó-
rias 
Medidas provisórias can be understood as a legally 
binding provisional executive decree and an anticipated 
legal proposition at the same time. Thus, in American legal 
terms, these measures are a mixture of a finite executive 
order with a presidential request for a bill. During the first 
120 days after the issuance of a medida provisória it is con-
sidered an executive order (a unilateral presidential di-
rective, to be more precise), hence having the force of law 
during these 120 days. Nevertheless, at the end of that 
time, the act must be voted on by Congress, so that it per-
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manently becomes law.  Otherwise the medida provisória is 
terminated and no longer legally exists.  
By provisional, one should understand this measure of execu-
tive power as temporary. Its full legal effectiveness right from 
the strike of a president ́s pen.  Effectiveness modulation: if the 
Chamber or Senate rejects the medida provisória or if it loses its 
validity, the federal lawmakers must edit a legislative decree 
restricting medida provisória’s effects while it was still valid. 
Article 62, paragraph 3 of the Brazilian Constitution al-
so states that medidas provisórias shall lose effectiveness 
from the day of their issuance if they are not converted into 
law within a period of sixty days, which may be extended 
once for an identical period of time under the terms of par-
agraph seven. The National Congress shall issue a legisla-
tive decree to regulate the legal relations arising from the 
medidas provisórias.  This reveals the potential short 
lifespan of a medida provisória that does not obtain con-
gressional approval to become law.  The only exceptions to 
this rule are found in Paragraphs 11 and 12, within Article 
62 of the medidas provisórias where the measure can 
commence as a presidential unilateral directive, but ends 
up as a law passed by the Congress. Article 62, paragraph 3 
of Brazilian Constitution states that the medidas provisó-
rias must be converted into law within 120 days. According 
to the Brazilian academic Marco Aurélio Greco, he con-
cludes that since they must be converted they cannot in-
herently be law through the stroke of a pen as is the case in 
the American Executive Order.25 Mr. Greco further de-
clares that medidas provisórias as being pure executive 
normative acts are devoid of legislative discretion.26  
Brazilian Supreme Court Justice, Eros Grau espouses a 
divergent viewpoint. In his perspective, medidas provisó-
rias not only carry the force of a law, they are also laws 
themselves. This is the law in Brazil as established by the 
Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). 
Aspects of the Brazilian Medidia Provisória  
Given that Brazilian law had a continuous back and 
forth relation regarding Executive decree’s issuance as a 
legitimate means of government legislative discretion, Bra-
zilian lawmakers are still trying to figure out the most ap-
propriate legal outcomes. Akin to what happens in the 
United States regarding executive orders, there is no estab-
lished consensus on the precise nature of the current me-
dida provisória. 
There is also no agreement on the nature of medidas 
provisórias, because there is no agreement on the clear 
limitations of medidas provisórias and to what extent they 
should be used. The issue is in the interpretation of the 
medidas provisórias in the Brazilian Constitution. Medidas 
Provisórias were designed with a duality of power in mind.  
They grant the Brazilian president the power to conceive 
laws whilst the Brazilian congress uses the measure to mit-
igate the power of the Executive.  Along with the time limi-
tations, there are limitations based on situational grounds. 
Medidas provisórias can only be issued under two specific 
                                                             
25 Greco, Marco Aurélio. Medidas Provisórias. São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais, 1991, p.15. 
26 Ibid, 15. 
circumstances.  The two situations are important and ur-
gent cases, thus the confusion derives from what is an im-
portant and urgent case.  
Congress is the one in charge of deeming what consti-
tutes an important or urgent case. The Brazilian  Supreme 
Court already ruled its own limitation regarding the analy-
sis of what is importance and urgent27 A judicial review by 
the Brazilian Supreme Court can only be done in certain 
cases, when both conditions are evidently absent.28 This 
judicial understanding follows Montesiqueu’s separation of 
powers principle.29 
Medidas provisórias can be struck down by Congress at 
any given time. A medida provisória can be converted into 
law and a few years later be altered by a new Congress.. 
Extremely unlikely, but possible, would be the termina-
tion of the entire medidas provisórias provision in the Bra-
zilian Constitution. The only requirement would be amend-
ing the Brazilian Constitution and the revocation of Article 
62. The Brazilian Congress is capable of undertaking such 
an action.   
The executive can also amend medidas provisórias. If a 
medida provisória is converted into law, the president can 
issue another medida provisória to suspend the previous 
one.  The Supreme Court of Brazil (STF) in a recent ruling 
upheld this notion, due to the fact that medida provisória is 
temporary.30 If the new medida provisória is passed by 
Congress, the previous medida provisória is revoked; if the 
medida provisória is not, the suspension is uplifted, and 
the previous medida provisória regresses into effect. 
The Brazilian Supreme Court can exercise common law 
judicial review and civil law abstract review. The goal of 
this article is not to delve into these subjects; however, it is 
worth mentioning that the conversion into law of medida 
provisórias does not validate legal flaws that occurred dur-
ing the formal proceedings to determine its legality. If vali-
dation were possible then there would be no judicial review 
to be established on formal grounds. 
Aside from time and situational requirements, a third 
limitation would be the subject. Unlike what happens in the 
U.S., where Lincoln suspended habeas corpus at the stroke 
of a pen, certain legal matters cannot be subjected to me-
dida provisória. These limitations are framed under the 
auspices of article 62, paragraph 1: 
“Paragraph 1. The issuance of provisional measures is 
forbidden when the matter involved: I – deals with: a) na-
tionality, citizenship, political rights, political parties, and 
election law; b) criminal law, criminal procedural law, and 
civil procedural law; c) organization of the Judicial Branch 
and of the Public Prosecution, the career and guarantees of 
their members; d) pluriannual plans, budgetary directives, 
budgets, and additional and supplementary credits, with 
the exception of the provision mentioned in article 167, 
                                                             
27 http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP= 
AC&docID=495496 
28 Ibid. 
29 http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP= 
AC&docID=347250 
30 http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP= 
TP&docID=750209316 
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paragraph 3; II – aims at the detention or seizure of goods, 
people’s savings, or any other financial asset; III – is re-
served for a supplementary law; IV – has already been reg-
ulated by a bill of law passed by the National Congress 
which is awaiting sanction or veto by the President of the 
Republic.”  
4. Comparing Executive Orders and Medidas 
Provisórias 
A major distinction between executive orders and Bra-
zilian medidas provisórias is highlighted by an executive 
order from the Grant Administration.31 One of the earliest 
executive orders still in force is executive order 9, issued on 
January 17, 1873, by President Ulysses S. Grant to curb 
abuses of power by individuals who concurrently held state 
and national political offices.32 This measure received con-
siderable fanfare when it was modified by Executive Order 
4439 issued on May 8, 1926, by President Calvin Coolidge 
for the purpose of aiding Prohibition enforcement by allow-
ing the same people to be simultaneously state and federal 
enforcement officers.33 Executive orders are not temporally 
constrained by the Constitution or any other legal ar-
rangement as medidas provisoríos are in Brazil.  
In contrast to the American executive order, medidas 
provisórias are temporally limited by the Constitution. 
They produce their effects once signed by the president, but 
they must comply with article 62 of the Brazilian constitu-
tion. After 120 days (60 + 60 days), if not voted on the me-
dida provisória ceases to exist.  
Unlike what happens in Brazil, where medidas provisó-
rios are extensively regulated by the local constitution, 
executive orders boundaries lack constitutional limits in 
America. In fact, the practice of exercising executive order 
authority is evolutionary, following the growth and history 
of the Executive branch itself.34 Robert B. Cash best advo-
cates this by stating, “The history of executive orders is, to a 
great extent, a narrative of the evolution of presidential 
power.”35 
 As Article II of the American Constitution states 
that the President must be the Chief Enforcer of the rule of 
law, this is under the purview of the American President 
and what he deems as enforcing the law.  This purview of 
"enforcing the law" inevitable varies as the American Presi-
                                                             
31 Yet, as previously shown, executive orders are often amended or 
revoked by subsequent presidents, thus altering or invalidating 
their content. As a result, these orders often have a time limit 
on the influence they wield. While there is a substantial body of 
research exam- ining when presidents decide to use this unilat-
eral tool, little is known about why and how long executive or-
ders remain a part of the law. Consequently, there exists a facet 
of presidential power left unexplored—the power to change or 
overturn previous orders.  
32 https://www.britannica.com/topic/executive-order 
33 https://www.britannica.com/topic/executive-order 
34 Greco, Marco Aurélio. Medidas Provisórias. São Paulo: Revista 
dos Tribunais, 1991, p.15. 
35 Robert B. Cash, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of 
Executive Orders, 39 Notre Dame L. Rev. 44 (1963), p. 55. 
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol39/iss1/4 
dent is also an individual and the resident of the office 
changes.   
Following the same steps, the Brazilian Constitution 
vests the president as the Chief Executive. Article 84, 
clause IV grants exclusive power to the President of the 
Republic to “sanction, promulgate and order the publica-
tion of laws, as well as to issue decrees and regulations for 
the true enforcement thereof.” 
5. Present Practices of Executive Power  
President Trump recsendid several Obama-era guidance 
directives—Title IX on college campuses, restroom accessi-
bility for transgender students, prohibiting military-grade-
weapons sales to local police—are all noteworthy instances 
of presidential federalism's inherent mutability. By the 
stroke of the presidential pen, policy was reversed.36 Blast-
ing the usurpation of presidential power through unilateral 
directives during the 2016 campaign that the Obama Ad-
ministration implemented, President Trump has now 
jumped on the presidential directive bandwagon by being 
an ever-increasing proponent of executive action.  At the 
time of this writing President Trump was more than well 
on his way to 310 executive orders with 121 of his own, 310 
being the average number of executive orders issued by 
two-term Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama.  Though it 
may not be an explicit tactic of the Trump Administration, 
the current president is aptly using Presidential Federalism 
to further his goals.  Nowhere can this be more seen in the 
recalcitrant way that he limited Medicaid after unable to 
undo the Affordable Care Act.   
President Temer was the Brazilian President who issued 
the most medidas provisórias since 1994 even though he 
did not serve a full term.  Most of these medidas provisó-
rias were done in an effort to stimulate the economy. He is 
only surpassed by two former vice-presidents who also 
became presidents themselves: Itamar Franco, substituting 
the impeached Collor de Mello, and José Sarney, who re-
placed Tancredo Neves, after his death. Temer is a consti-
tutional professor and he was one of the architects of the 
1988 Brazilian Constitution. Ironically, he was a stark critic 
of medidas provisórias in his book Constituição e Política, 
written in 1994.37 Temer ́s criticism concerning medidas pro-
visórias as being an artificial borrowing from the Italian Consti-
tution still reverberates.38   
President Bolsonaro follows differs from his predeces-
sor.. Although being perceived as a trouble maker regard-
ing Executive-Legislative relations, Bolsonaro does not 
implements its policies through medidas provisórias as 
much as the former presidents did. Indeed, most of his 
medidas provisórias  so far have been struck down. Howev-
                                                             
36 Jacobs, Nicholas F., and Connor M. Ewing. "The Law: The 
Promises and Pathologies of Presidential Federalism." Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2018): 552-69. 
doi:10.1111/psq.12480. Pg. 561.   
37https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/temer-o-presidente-que-mais-
enviou-medidas-provisorias-ao-congresso-21895565 
38 Temer, Michel. “Elementos de Direito Constitucional”. 
Malheiros Publisher, 22th edition, 2008, pg. 153-154.  
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er, MP 881 which bolstered economic freedoms is one of 
the most iconic, was passed with few modifications.  
Medida provisória proceedings are undergoing signifi-
cant changes. One of them is related to modifications 
throughout the approval process in Congress.39 Senators 
complained of the short deadlines allocated to legal altera-
tions once the medida provisória is presented in Congress. 
Thus, the new proceedings may dilute time limits.   
6. Conclusion 
It is unlikely that the power of the American Executive 
vis-à-vis Congress will diminish anytime soon as the execu-
tive order has become a formidable staple of the American 
President.  Executive orders may be revoked or amended 
but they are likely to stay in vogue until a cataclysmic event 
tarnishes the office of the president.  Another scenario that 
is unlikely to occur is that of an individual assuming the 
presidency that is an acute enthusiast of legislative power, 
someone who is willing to cede power.   
 In Brazil, the future of medidas provisórias does 
not seem clear. At first, article 62 was followed by just one 
paragraph. Two decades later, one paragraph became 
twelve, limiting considerably what was previously estab-
lished. Following the same path, ongoing new proceedings 
that may alter the Brazilian Constitution, which can expand 
legislative power over medidas provisória. These moves 
towards restricting the influence of medidas provisórias 
can be interpreted as a mitigated attack on executive dis-
cretion. The President of the Chamber of Deputies, Rodrigo 
Maia, has recently been making overtures in Congress to 
bring about the end of medidas provisórias.  
The ultimate question posed by comparing the Ameri-
can executive order to the Brazilian medida provisoria is 
which one has more power? It is without a doubt that the 
American executive wields more power through the execu-
tive order.  It can be clearly ascertained that the reasoning 
behind this is that the American President has in a way 
garnered more power throughout the preceding decades 
due to a more gridlocked Congress and a nuanced usurpa-
tion of presidential power that has significantly increased 
in the previous several decades.  The Brazilian President 
relies on the Brazilian Congress to validate the medida 
provisória, no such validation is required for an American 
executive order. 
                                                             
39 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2019/06/06/ 
mudanca-no-rito-das-mps-chega-ao-senado 
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Annex 
 
AS-
PECT/INSTRUMENT 
EXECUTIVE ORDER (US) MEDIDA PROVISÓRIA (BR) 
FORCE OF LAW  Yes  Yes, though temporary. 
LEGAL NATURE No consensus No consensus 
HISTORY Unofficially:  George Washington,  
Officially:  Abraham Lincoln, 1862.  
Started in 1988. 
REQUIREMENTS No requirements In important and urgent cases 
BASIS Partially in the Constitution, because 
neither its text, nor Founding Fathers 
expressly mentioned it. 
Art. 62  
POLITICAL INFLU-
ENCE 
Not clear, since there is no consensus. The Italian Constitution of 1947 via decreto-legge. 
USAGE (OBJECT) For practical Administration internal 
endeavours, although there were cases 
beyond Executive’s discretion.   
Art. 62, § 1º The issuance of provisional measures is forbidden 
when the matter involved:  
I – deals with: 
a) nationality, citizenship, political rights, political parties, and 
election law; b) criminal law, criminal procedural law, and civil 
procedural law; c) organization of the Judicial Branch and of 
the Public Prosecution, the career and guarantees of their 
members; d) pluriannual plans, budgetary directives, budgets, 
and additional and supplementary credits, with the exception 
of the provision mentioned in article 167, paragraph 3; 
II – aims at the detention or seizure of goods, people’s savings, 
or any other financial asset;  
III – is reserved for a supplementary law; IV – has already 
been regulated by a bill of law passed by the National Congress 
which is awaiting sanction or veto by the President of the Re-
public. 
IV – has already been regulated by a bill of law passed by the 
National Congress which is awaiting sanction or veto by the 
President of the Republic.  
 
ENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER MEDIDA PROVISÓRIA 
CANCELATION 1. By Congress 
2. By the Supreme Court 
3. Succeeding Presidents or the same President 
1. By Congress 
2. By the Supreme Court82: 
2.1. Abstract review 
2.2. Concrete review  
3. Succeeding  Presidents or the same President83 
SUPERSEDING  The issuing president or a succeeding one may mod-
ify the executive order as President Coolidge did to 
U.S. Grant´s Executive Order No. 9. 
The issuing president or a succeeding one may modify 
the executive order. 
AMENDMENT Does not exist Voting process 
DEADLINE No term limit.  Constitutional provision: 
60 + 60 days, without Congress approval.  
art. 62, § 3º of Brazilian Constitution.  
 
                                                             
82 Brazil does adopt both abstract constitutional review (like the US does) and concrete review (like most of continental Europe does). 
We do not intend to focus on Provisional Measures vis-à-vis Brazilian dual constitutional review system, due to the fact that it re-
quires a proper study, only devoted to this subject.   
83 https://www.conjur.com.br/2007-out-21/medida_provisoria_revogar_outra_mp_supremo 
